Most of my research analyzes how firms and individuals can credibly convey information -- how a firm can prove that its products are high quality, how an advertisement can successfully persuade a consumer, how a stock analyst can credibly rate a stock, or how a manager can prove her ability. My coauthors and I show that costless, unverifiable "cheap talk" is a more powerful communication tool than one might think (Cheap Talk Comparisons, Best Foot Forward, Comparative Cheap Talk, Persuasion by Cheap Talk, Biased Recommendations, Persuasive Puffery, Subversive Conversations) and that costly "signaling" and verifiable "persuasion" are less reliable communication tools than one might think (Countersignaling, False Modesty, Label Confusion, Coarse Grades, Consistent News).
Areas of Expertise
- Information Economics, Strategic Communication, Industrial Organization
Research Interests: game theory; strategic communication; managerial economics; chinese economy
Research Areas:
- Chinese economy; economics of communication; Chinese characters; Internet economy
