I have written about truth, logical truth, rule-following, semantic anti-individualism, ontology, realism, contextual apriority, the analytic-synthetic distinction, and self-knowledge.
I am currently writing a book that presents a systematic new reading of Quine’s revolutionary paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” and examines recent efforts to define and defend an epistemologically substantive analytic–synthetic distinction.
I am interested in the sort of naturalism that results from accepting the scientific orientation in philosophy that logical empiricists such was Carnap urged, but giving up the logical empiricist's analytic-synthetic distinction, following W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam.
Among other things I have written extensively about how to reconcile naturalistic accounts of mental content with the idea that we ordinarily know the contents of our utterances without any special empirical investigation.
Research Interests:
- philosophy of language and mind; philosophy of logic; epistemology and history of analytic philosophy, especially Carnap and Quine
Keywords:
- Epistemology
- Philosophy of Mind and Action
- History of Philosophy
